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Abstract
For Japan, the ongoing severe scal condition requires urgent
attention. To redress this situation, certain policy options are
available: for instance, tax policy shift, pension system reform,
and accelerating the economic growth. In this study, I quantify
these policy changes required for achieving scal consolidation on
the basis of an overlapping generations (OLG) model that consid-
ers multiple generations and provide a policy comparison of these
options using the utility of each generation as a criterion. The
simulation results suggest that a drastic policy change is neces-
sary. If the consolidation were to depend only on the increase in
consumption tax, the tax rate should be about 30%. In the case
of pension system reform, its replacement rate should be cut to
less than half of that in the current system. Among the policy
options, pension reform seems to be suitable from the viewpoint
of intergenerational equality and long-term economic growth.
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1 Introduction
Japan is among the countries facing the severest scal condition. The
Japanese government's net nancial liability was more than 100% of its
nominal GDP in 2009, and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) forecasts it would reach 150% in 2014 (Figure 1).
Several studies investigate the reason for Japan's rapidly accelerating
debt accumulation. Some suggest that the economic slump during the
1990s has caused the severe scal condition since then owing to the re-
sulting tax revenue decrease, while others insist the excess government
expenditure in the early 1990s is the cause of the huge decit 1. However,
the most important factor that contributed to the debt accumulation was
the drastic increase in social security expenditure. As seen in the analysis
provided by the Ministry of Finance of Japan (MOF) 2, which decomposes
the causes of debt accumulation, the total increase in government debt
from the end of FY1990 to FY20133 is about JPY 571 trillion. It reports
that, among them, the decrease in tax revenues and the increase in public
expenditure account for 26% and 10% of this debt increase, respectively.
The impact of increase in social security expenditure exceeds that of these
two factors: it explains 33% of the total debt accumulation. Moreover,
the negative impacts of social security expenditure on scal decit have
evolved over the years. Given the forecast of future population distribu-
tion (Figure 2), the expenditure on social security is estimated to grow
steadily in case the current social security system is not reconstructed.
On considering this scal condition and the estimated future demo-
graphic structure in Japan, resent studies have insisted that a high tax
rate relative to the current system is needed for achieving scal consol-
idation. Doi et al. (2011) concludes that the percentage of government
revenue must rise permanently to 40{47% of GDP in the future from the
33% in 2010 to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. Imrohoroglu and Sudo
(2011) insist that even an annual growth rate of 3% in GDP over the
1Fukuda and Yamada (2011) investigates the relationship between the size of the
Japanese government's scal stimulus and stock prices and nd that taking the stock
prices as the policy target resulted in the excess expenditure.
2It is available at http://www.mof.go.jp/budget/fiscalcondition/
relateddata/sy01423.pdf (in Japanese).
3The value in FY2013 is based on the budget for that year.
2
next 20 years, combined with a new consumption tax rate of 15%, may
be insucient to achieve a consistent primary surplus. Moreover, Imro-
horoglu and Hansen (2012) simulate the future Japanese scal situation
and report a nearly permanent increase in consumption tax of about 30%
is needed for scal consolidation.
One signicant issue is that because these studies depend on a simple
model or representative agent model and exclude the detailed pension sys-
tem, they might have underestimated the impact of demographic change.
To overcome this problem, Braun and Joines (2011) calculate the con-
sumption tax rate sucient for scal soundness on the basis of the model
in Braun et al. (2009). They use the OLG model, which contains rich de-
scriptions of the demographic structure, and report that the consumption
tax rate should be raised to 33% according to the baseline simulation.
Thus, in this strand of previous research, there seemed to be consensus
that a drastic policy shit is required in case scal consolidation is to be
nanced by an increase in the consumption tax rate. However, in this
regard, other policy options could be considered as well. For example,
increasing other tax rates or reducing pension payments are two such
options. Although the Japanese government has decided to increase the
consumption tax rate to 10% gradually, we must reexamine the other
policy options. For this purpose, this study merges the impacts of policy
reforms not only in the case of consumption tax, but also in other cases.
In essence, I consider ve policy options: increasing the tax rates on
consumption, labor income, and capital income; decreasing the pension
replacement rate; and increasing the technology growth rate. I quantify
the amount needed for consolidation using the OLG model.
After obtaining quantitative results, we may want to know qualitative
ones, that is, the order of suitability of these options. By considering
policy comparisons for the Japanese scal system, Okamoto (2007) in-
vestigates the optimal way to sustain the scal condition in an aging
Japanese economy using households' discounted utility as a judging cri-
terion. As pointed out in this study, however, its simulation concentrates
on the stationary equilibrium and the results obtained in such a case are
dierent from those for the transition path. By taking this analysis one
step further, this study calculates the utility of each generation, classied
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by birth year, during the transition path. I compare the policy options
from the viewpoint of intergenerational equality using utility as the eval-
uation standard. These analyses provide important policy lessons for the
Japanese economy.
This remainder of paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3
describe the model and method of simulation, respectively. Section 4
provides the simulation results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
This section provides the model setting. It is based on the general
equilibrium OLG model of Braun et al. (2009) with heterogeneity in each
generation. It consists of three agents, a household, rm, and government.
Time is discretized by year t (t = Ts; : : : ; Te).
2.1 Demographics
In order to capture the impact of demographic change on the scal
condition in Japan, I introduce a detailed population structure. Japan's
demographic distribution is replicated by the following Markov process.
266664
Ss;t+1
...
...
Se;t+1
377775 =
2666664
nSs;t 0 0 : : : 0 0
 Ss;t 0 0 : : : 0 0
0  Ss+1;t 0 : : : 0 0
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
0 0 0 : : :  Se 1;t 0
3777775
266664
Ss;t
...
...
Se;t
377775 ; (1)
where s;t is the population size of age s (s = Ss; : : : ; Se) generation at
year t.  s;t and nss;t stand for the conditional survival probability of
age s generation and population growth rate of age ss generation at year
t, respectively. Given the initial distribution, survival probability, and
population growth rate of age ss generation exogenously, equation (1)
creates Japan's demographic distribution. As is pointed out, I consider
heterogeneity in each generation. The type of household is represented
by i (i = 1; : : : ; I). ij;t in equation (2) is the size of type i agent whose
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age is j at year t, and i denes the share of type i household against
j;t. Thus, the sum of 
i
j;t is the total population size of the country at
year t (Nt).
ij;t = 
ij;t; Nt =
JX
j=1
IX
i=1
ij;t: (2)
In my calculation, I normalize the size of the total population at an initial
year to 1 and dene the country-wide population growth rate as nt
NTs = 1; nt =
Nt+1
Nt
  1: (3)
2.2 Household
A household's problem is nite. In the model, the age of the representa-
tive household is represented by j(j = 1; : : : ; Lr; : : : ; J). Each household
enters into the economy at age 20 (j = 1) and works during age j = Jr 1.
After retirement, she lives by dis-saving her assets and receiving pension
payments until age j = J . Throughout her lifetime, every household faces
an uninsurable probability of death. The discounted sum of the lifetime
utility of a type i household at age 1 at year m(t = m + j   1) is as
follows:
U im =
JX
j=1
j 1j;tu
 
cij;t; l
i
j;t

; (4)
where  is the discount factor and j;t is the unconditional survival prob-
ability. u() is an instantaneous utility function. cij;t and lij;t are the
consumption and labor input of an age j, type i agent. The budget
constraint at year t and age j is equation (5).
(1 + c;t)c
i
j;t + a
i
j+1;t+1 = f1 + (1  r;t)rtgaij;t
+ (1  w;t)wteij;tlij;t (j < Jr) + bj;t (j  Jr);
(5)
where aij;t is asset holdings at the beginning of year t. I assume that
households enters into the economy without holding any assets and do
not leave any intentional bequests. Then, the following condition holds:
a1;t = aJ+1;t = 0: (6)
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rt; wt are the factor prices. c;t; r;t and w;t are the tax rates on consump-
tion, capital income, and labor income, respectively. bj;t is the pension
benet.  () takes 1 if the condition in parenthesis is satised and 0
otherwise. The remaining factor eij;t is the labor eciency of a type i
household, which is the source of heterogeneity in a generation. Since
agents with higher eciency gain higher labor incomes, it generates the
income classes of households. A household determines her proles of con-
sumption, asset, and labor input by maximizing the lifetime utility (4)
under the constraint (5).
2.3 Firm
A representative rm has a standard Cobb{Douglas production tech-
nology:
Yt = ZtK

t L
1 
t ; (7)
where Yt is the output, Zt is the total factor productivity (TFP), Kt is
the aggregate capital stock, Lt is the aggregate labor input at year t, and
parameter  is the capital share. Capital depreciates at a rate t, and
hence, capital transition follows equation (8)
Kt+1 = It + (1  t)Kt; (8)
where It denotes investment. Since goods' markets are perfectly compet-
itive, the factor prices are deed as follows:
wt = (1  )Zt

Kt
Lt

;
rt = Zt

Kt
Lt
 1
  t;
(9)
where wt represents the wage rate and rt is the rental rate on capital.
2.4 The government
The government has three roles in the model. First, it collects taxes
imposed on consumption, capital income, and labor income. Therefore,
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the general government tax revenue at time t (Tt) is the sum of tax
payments by all households existing at that time.
Tt =
JX
j=1
IX
i=1
c;tc
i
j;t
i
j;t +
JX
j=2
IX
i=1
r;trtat
i
j;t +
Jr 1X
j=1
IX
i=1
w;twtl
i
j;t
i
j;t: (10)
Second, it runs the pay-as-you-go pension system. The pension payment
for retired households is equation (11).
bj;t = t
PJr 1
j=1 wtl
i
j;t
i
j;tPJr
j=1 j;t
; (11)
where t is a pension replacement rate
4 at year t. The total pension
expenditure of the government is described in the following equation:
Pt =
JX
j=Jr
bj;tj;t: (12)
The nal role is that of government spending. The government plays
these roles under its budget constraint, that is, equation (13).
Dt+1 + Tt +Bt = (1 + rt)Dt +Gt + Pt: (13)
On the left-hand side of the equation is the general government's rev-
enue and on the other, is its expenditure. Dt is the government debt
outstanding at year t and Bt is a bequest
5.
2.5 Market clearing
Before describing market clearing conditions, I dene the relationships
between aggregate and individual variables. For an arbitrary individual
variable xij;t, the aggregated variable is described as Xt. For example,
aggregate consumption, asset and labor input are dened as follows.
Ct =
JX
j=1
IX
i=1
cij;t
i
j;t;
Lt =
JX
j=Jr
IX
i=1
lij;t
i
j;t:
(14)
4It stands for a ratio of pension payments for retired households against the average
before-tax labor income of workers.
5One rationale is that a collected bequest is in government revenue
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The aggregate asset plus government debt is equal to the aggregate capital
stock, and thus, the asset market clearing condition is equation (15).
At +Dt = Kt: (15)
The standard goods market clearing condition is as follows:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt: (16)
3 Simulation Method
In this section, I explain the method used to solve the model described
thus far. After providing the targets or sources of parameters and exoge-
nous variables, I briey illustrate how to solve the model.
3.1 Calibration and settings
I assume an instantaneous utility function in equation (4) as logarith-
mic.
u(ct; lt) = log(c
i
j;t) +  log(lj;t   lij;t); (17)
where  is a parameter that determines leisure share and lj;t is time en-
dowment for an age j agent at year t. Note that individual labor input
is endogenously solved in my settings.
The other parameters are listed in Table 1. The discount factor  is
targeted to the average values of the capital{output ratio to match the
actual value from 1970 to 2007. Leisure share  is set to match the average
of annual hours worked per working population from 1970 to 2008.
As to the settings of year and age, the initial period is 2010 and a
household lives from 20 to 95 years in the benchmark simulation (Table
2). For the calculation of population distribution, however, I set the
initial year to 1955 (Ss = 1955) and calculate the distribution of age 0{
95. It improves the tness of the population distribution generated by
the model to the actual distribution by taking numerous samples. As to
the terminal year in the simulation, it is set to 2200 (Se = 2200) for both
calculations. Taking long periods ensures the convergence to the terminal
stationary equilibrium.
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3.2 Data
Within aggregate variables, fCt; Kt; At; Ltg are endogenously solved.
The others are exogenous variables or variables calculated by combining
other variables. Table 3 summarizes the source of exogenous variables.
For data on demographic structure and government debt, I used historical
and estimated values; the other data are historical values.
Demographic: Historical data concerning demographics are from the
Human Mortality Database (HMD) for 1955{2009. For estimating
values from 2011 to 2060, I use \Population Projection for Japan:
2011-2060 (January 2012)" by National Institute of Population and
Social Security Research (IPSS). As regards population distribution
at 2010, it is sourced from \Population Estimates" by the Ministry
of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW).
Technology: I applied the dataset from Miyazawa and Yamada (2012)
to produce the TFP growth rate. It is calculated as a Solow resid-
ual depending on the Cobb{Douglas production function (Equation
(7)). Miyazawa and Yamada (2012) provided the details for the
construction of TFP.
Individual productivity: In the simulation, households are classied
by age (j) and labor eciency (i = 1; : : : ; 4). The latter is the
type of household in the model and is dened as the educational
background. Figure 3 plots the labor eciency by type at year
2010 (eij), and it is sourced from \Basic Survey on Wage Structure"
provided by the MHLW.
Government: The government spending{output ratio is also fromMiyazawa
and Yamada (2012). The historical data for the debt{output ratio
are from \Economic Outlook 93" by OECD. Estimation values from
2011 to 2014 are also from OECD. I assume that the estimated val-
ues from 2015 are along with the government scal consolidation
plan. The Japanese Cabinet decided "Basic Policies for Economics
and Fiscal Management and Reform" in 2013. It aimed to cut the
ratio of primary decit to GDP of the national and local govern-
ments in half between FY2010 and FY2015 and achieve a surplus
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by FY2020. Following this plan, the estimated debt{output ratio
is assumed to stop increasing from 2020 (Figure 4). One of the
main motivations of this study is to calculate the tax rates and
growth rate needed for achieving such a government scal consoli-
dation plan. The tax rates are from a updated version of Mendoza
et al. (1994), and the replacement rates of the pension system in
Equation (11) are based on the value of projections in "Financial
Verication in 2009 (standard household)" by the MHLW.
3.3 Calculations
Given the exogenous variables and parameters, I calculate the path of
endogenous variables. The procedure is as follows.
1. Calculate the population distribution using Equation (1).
2. Calculate the initial and terminal stationary equilibrium.
3. Guess the transition path of fKt; Lt; Xtg6, where Xt is a variable
that adjusted to sustain scal condition.
4. The given parameters, exogenous variables and population distri-
bution, solve the household problems for individual consumption,
labor input, and asset holding (fcij;t; lij;t; aij;tg).
5. Aggregate the individual variables obtained at step 4 and check the
resource constraint, labor market clearing condition, asset market
clearing condition, and government budget constraint7.
6. If these four constraints are satised, the solution is achieved. Oth-
erwise, update the initial guess in step 3 and repeat steps 3{6.
To calculate the initial stationary equilibrium, I use the actual asset dis-
tribution at 2010 and for the initial guess at step 3, we interpolate between
the values of initial and terminal stationary equilibrium linearly.
6After obtaining the values of aggregate capital and labor, I can calculate the factor
prices needed for solving the household problem.
7From Walras' Law, one of these conditions is automatically satised.
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4 Simulation Results
The two main objectives of this study are to quantify the impact of
policy changes for achieving Japan's scal consolidation and to compare
policy options based on generations' utility. Since such exercises should
depend on a model that can explain some aspects of an actual economy, I
start by checking the performance of the model described so far and then
move to the main analyses.
4.1 Model's performance
To examine the tness of the model to historical data, I set a simulation
period from 1970 to 2200. The model includes a lump-sum tax (transfer).
Therefore, the government budget constraint is satised by adjusting it.
In addition, the initial asset distribution is sourced from Hayahi et al.
(1988). These settings are in line with those in Braun et al. (2009). Fig-
ures 5{7 plot the model-generated main variables, growth rate of output,
capital{output ratio, and annual hours worked per working population.
In comparison, I depict the actual data and the results of Braun et al.
(2009) simultaneously. Note that there are two main dierences between
my model settings and that of Braun et al. (2009). First, I use a dierent
data set. Although Braun et al. (2009) used the dataset constructed
by Hayashi and Prescott (2002), my simulation is based on the dataset
from Miyazawa and Yamada (2012) as I briey explained in the previous
section8. Second, Braun et al. (2009) did not consider the heterogeneity
within generations. In my model, however, households are classied not
only by age but also by labor eciency. In Figure 6, the capital{output
ratio of my model is relatively high compared to that of Braun et al.
(2009). This tendency is caused by the heterogeneity in my model. Since
capital accumulation is aected by the high labor eciency type agent in
my setting, the level of aggregate capital is higher than that of Braun et
8As previous studies applying large-scale OLG models to the Japanese economy
(Braun et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2007), for example) showed, the TFP growth
rate is a major driving factor that determines the movement of macro variables. Thus,
a minor dierence in TFP construction aects the simulations' outcomes.
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al. (2009). Thus, my model can replicate the actual output growth and
capital{output ratio relatively well.
4.2 Settings in benchmark simulation
In this subsection, I explain the conditions assumed in the main calcu-
lation. In the benchmark simulation, I set 2010{2200 as the simulation
period. I assume that the initial stationary equilibrium is the one in which
exogenous variables are set to the average values during 2000{2007, while
the population distribution and debt{output ratio are the actual one in
2010. The values assumed in the initial stationary equilibrium are pre-
sented in Table 4. From the initial stationary equilibrium, I calculate
the transition path to the terminal stationary equilibrium. During the
transition path, the values of exogenous variables do not change from the
values in the initial stationary equilibrium, other than in the case of vari-
ables concerning population and the debt{output ratio. Since variables
for population are based on population estimates and the debt{output
ratio is from the government plan, the results mainly enhance the eects
of changes in demographics and tax policies. As to the future value of
demographics, the estimation by IPSS is from 2010 to 2060. I assume
that after 2060, the survival rate and birth rate remain at the values in
2060 and the population distribution smoothly converges to stationary
distribution after that. For the estimated value of the debt{output ratio,
since the government's estimation also ends in 2020, I assume the value
after that period is kept to that of 2020.
In order to achieve scal consolidation in line with the government
projection, we must assume that some exogenous variables in the govern-
ment budget constraint of the technology growth rate should be adjusted.
Therefore, I consider the following ve scenarios:
(i) Increasing tax rate on consumption (c)
(ii) Increasing tax rate on labor income (w)
(iii) Increasing tax rate on capital income (r)
(iv) Increasing growth rate of TFP ()
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(v) Decreasing pension replacement rate ()
With these scenarios, I calculate tax rates or growth rates to smooth scal
conditions and compare these policies using the utility of generations as
a criterion.
4.3 Quantitative analysis
Thus far, I conrmed the performance of the model and summarized
the settings for the main analyses. Now, I consider the rst problem:
by how much do we need to increase the tax rates or growth rate to
redress Japan's scal problem? I execute the required simulations un-
der the assumption that the scal consolidation is achieved following the
government's plan. I explain the results scenario by scenario.
Table 5 presents the results. It reports the average tax rates, TFP
growth rate, and pension replacement rate needed for scal consolidation.
It also depicts the actual tax or growth rates between 2000 and 2007.
(i) consumption tax: Line 1 of Table 5 reports the results of scenario
(i). Although the tax rate on consumption was 10.5% in 2000{2007,
it should be increased to more than 15% immediately in the 2010s.
Finally, it should be nearly 30% in the 2030s: these values coincide
with that in the previous literature.
(ii) labor income tax: The labor income tax rate should be more than
50% in the 2030s. As Figure 2 shows, the working-age population
in Japan will decrease steadily. When we rely on the labor income
tax for the funds required for consolidation, we cast a higher burden
on the declining working generations.
(iii) capital income tax: As to the case of capital income tax, its rate
should be increased to incredibly high rate. In my settings, the
capital market is complete, and hence, the rental rate for capital
equals the interest rate on government debt. Therefore, in case (iii),
the government suers from a huge burden of interest payment on
increasing the capital income tax. Further, the problems related to
an aging population become more severe over the years. Increasing
the capital income tax impedes capital accumulation.
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(iv) TFP growth: Note that I cannot achieve a solution in the simu-
lations in the case of scenarios (iv). This means a growth rate of
technology that satises the government budget constraint without
bailing the other equilibrium conditions does not exist. Imrohoroglu
and Sudo (2011) show that even if the government adopted a mixed
policy of 2% TFP growth rate with 15% consumption tax, it might
be insucient for scal consolidation. My model simulation re-
conrmed this nding. It indicates that it is impossible to attain
a sound scal condition through increasing the technology growth
even if a growth miracle occurs. However, notice that there are
dierences between my assumptions and that of Imrohoroglu and
Sudo (2011). While my model assumes an overlapping generations
household structure, Imrohoroglu and Sudo (2011) use the repre-
sentative agent model. Therefore, they neither capture the impact
of demographic change to the extent required nor consider that of
the pension system. The results of Imrohoroglu and Sudo (2011)
seem to underestimate the impact of demographic shifts.
(v): replacement rate: In the nal scenario, I consider the case that
the government changes the pension system through decreasing the
replacement rate of pension payments ( in equation (11)). In 2004,
the Japanese government decided that the replacement rate would
be kept to more than 50% in the future representative household in
the revised pension system. In the simulation, however, to calculate
the value required for scal consolidation, I remove this government-
decided rate. Line 6 of Table 5 shows the result of scenario (v) that
reports the replacement rate should be 22.5% in the 2030s. Seeing
that its average value during 2000{2007 was more than 50%, the
rate may need to be cut by more than half in the future.
4.4 Policy comparison
In the previous subsection, I provided quantitative results that showed
that drastic policy changes are needed for achieving scal consolidation in
the future. The second question is determining, within such policy shifts,
the one that is favorable. For this purpose, I calculate the discounted sum
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of lifetime utility (Equation (4)) of the household that represents each
generation. Using it as an evaluation standard, I compare the impacts of
policy changes.
Figure 8 plots the level of lifetime utilities of generations with type
1 labor-eciency under four scenarios (scenarios (i), (ii), (iii) and (v)).
The horizontal axis depicts the household's birth year and the vertical
axis, its utility level. In comparison, the lifetime utility of a household
born in 1911 under scenario (i) is normalized to unity. For example, the
utility of the generation born in 1980 is around 0.95 in scenario (i). This
means that the lifetime utility of the 1980 generation is 5% lower than
that of the 1911 generation when the scal consolidation is achieved by
increasing the consumption tax rate. Note that the simulation starts from
2010. Therefore, the individual variables (consumption, labor input, and
asset holding) before 2010 are xed to the values at the initial stationary
equilibrium and the dierence in the utilities of households is derived
from their utility maximization problems after 2010.
As Figure 8 shows, the four policy changes, namely, in relation to the
consumption tax, labor income tax, capital income tax and replacement
rate, have dierent impacts on each generation's utility. For the genera-
tions born before after around 1970, scenario (ii) is the most preferable
and scenario (v) is the worst. In contrast, for the generations born after
around 1970, the order of preference is scenario (v), (i), (ii), and (iii).
The interpretation of the policy eects on older generations is straight-
forward. An increment in labor income tax is preferable for the gen-
erations who have already retired in 2010 because they do not suer
direct damage to their utility. In contrast, the fall in replacement rate
is the worst scenario for them. Since the agent cannot foresee the policy
changes before 2010, a drop in pension payment distorts the consumption
smoothing of the retired generation.
For the generations employed in 2010 and for the future generations,
the reform by cutting pension payments brings the highest utility in the
four scenarios. There are two intuitive explanations for this result. First,
the pension reform policy forces all generations, including the retired,
to share the pain of scal consolidation. It lightens the burden of scal
consolidation upon the shoulders of future generations. Second, it en-
15
hances economic growth. Figure 9 plots the output level under the four
scenarios. In the gure, the output level in 2010 under scenario (i) is nor-
malized to 1. The increase in consumption tax hinders economic growth
for the rst 5{10 years relative to scenario (ii). From the viewpoint of
long-term growth, however, taxing consumption is better than taxing la-
bor or capital income tax. Moreover, cutting pension payments enhances
the economic growth from the short run to the long run, relative to the
other cases.
As to increase in labor and capital income tax (scenario (ii) and (iii)),
the future generations suer from a serious utility loss under these sce-
narios. For example, the lifetime utility of the generation to be born in
2020 would only be 75% and 65% of that of the generation born in 1911 if
scenario (ii) and (iii) were to be selected, respectively. As Figure 2 shows,
the aging of population structure is estimated to become increasingly se-
vere. The working population in the 2020s will be about 13% lesser than
that in 2010. Taxing labor or capital income is not preferable policy for
the future generations in a reducing-population economy. Moreover, as I
pointed out in previous subsection, increase in tax rate on capital income
enlarges the burden of interest payment on the government. Taxing cap-
ital income is the worst policy in an economy that has accumulated huge
debt.
Note that there exists a severe preference gap between the retired gen-
erations and future generations. While the most preferable policy for the
older generations is scenario (ii), the policy that brings the highest level
of utility for the future generations is scenario (v). When we calculate the
size of population agreeing to an increase in the labor income tax and that
agreeing with the policy that decreases the replacement rate in 2010 9 , 73
million prefer scenario (ii) and 28 million prefer scenario (v). This means
that in the economy with \selsh" households that the model assumed,
the preferable policy for the future generations and long-run economic
growth (scenario (v)) may not be chosen through a democratic policy
decision based on the current population distribution.
9They coincide with the size of households who are 40{99 years old (were born in
1911{1970) and 20{37 years old (were born in 1973{1990) in 2010, respectively.
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4.5 Policy implications
As indicated by the simulation results, cutting the pension replacement
rate is the preferable policy shift from the viewpoint of intergenerational
equality and long-run economic growth. However, the results also show
that a consensus to agree with pension reform cannot be achieved if house-
holds are selsh. Without these results, we may tend to believe that it
is hard to realize the policy to cut the pension payments of the current
retired generation. Thus, the current government policy, that is, combin-
ing pension system reform with increasing consumption tax may be the
preferable way.
The other implication is about labor and capital income tax. As both
the quantitative analysis and policy comparison showed, increasing the
labor income tax is undesirable for the future generations in an economy
in which the size of working-age generations is shrinking.
5 Conclusions
This study examined two questions concerning Japan's scal recon-
struction. First, I calculated the quantity needed to redress the scal
condition using an OLG model that considers multiple generations. The
results imply that for scal consolidation, it is necessary to change the
tax or pension system drastically. When the consolidation fund is en-
tirely dependent on an increase in the consumption tax rate, its rate is
estimated to be nearly 30% in 2030s. This value almost coincides with
that in the previous literature. The second question was identifying out
of all feasible policy options, the one preferable for each generation. This
study claried the serious gap between older and future generations in
their preferences. I also pointed out that pension system reform is the
one preferable option, considering intergenerational equality.
This research could be improved in two ways. The rst one is consid-
ering other policy choice criteria. In this study, I used the discounted
sum of lifetime utility; however, using discounted utility underestimates
the instantaneous utility of older generations. The other is the use of
heterogeneity within generations. Although the tax and part of pension
17
systems that the model described are linear and simple, the actual sys-
tems are non-linear and more complicated. For example, the tax rate on
labor income changes by the income class discontinuously and pension
payments depend on the lifetime income. Considering such non-linear
systems would change the results or order of policy preferences and con-
tribute to good use of the heterogeneity of generations.
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Table 1: Value, target and source of parameters
Parameters Value Target or source
 discount factor 0.985 Capital{output ratio  avg. 1970-2007
 leisure share 0.361 Annual hours worked per working population  avg. 1970-2008
 capital share 0.36 Miyazawa and Yamada (2012)
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Table 2: Settings
Settings Value
Calculation for population distribution
Ts initial year 1955
Te terminal year 2200
Ss initial age 0
Se terminal age 99
Calculation for household problems
Jr retirement age 46 65 years old in actual economy
J terminal age 76 95 years old in actual economy
22
Table 3: Settings and source of exogenous variables
Exogenous variables Source
Demographics
0 pop. growth rate of age 0 generations
s;Ts initial pop. dist. HMD, IPSS (forecast)
 s;t survival rate
Production
Z Total Factor Productivity Miyazawa and Yamada (2012)
Government
G=Y government spending output ratio Miyazawa and Yamada (2012)
D=Y debt output ratio OECD
c tax rate on consumption Mendoza et al. (1994)
r tax rate on capital income Mendoza et al. (1994)
w tax rate on labor income Mendoza et al. (1994)
 replacement rate MHLW (2009)
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Table 4: Settings at initial Stationary Equilibrium for benchmark simu-
lation
Exogenous variables Value
   1 growth rate of TFP 0.0161
G=Y government spending output ratio 0.1792
c tax rate on consumption 0.06
r tax rate on capital income 0.2744
w tax rate on labor income 0.4261
 replacement rate 0.53
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Table 5: Average tax, growth and replacement rates to achieve scal
consolidation
scenarios adjustment 2000{2007 2010s 2020s 2030s
(i) consumption tax 6.00% 16.12% 23.84% 29.94%
(ii) labor income tax 27.44% 38.92% 46.78% 54.95%
(iii) capital income tax 42.61% 65.74% 77.94% 87.19%
(iv) TFP growth 1.61% (no solution)
(v) pen. rep. rate 53.0% 35.30% 26.99% 22.48%
Note: The values in column '2000-2007' are actual rate.
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Figure 1: General government net nancial liabilities as a percentage of
GDP
Source: OECD "Economic Outlook No. 93"
Note: Estimates start after 2012.
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Figure 2: Population distribution in Japan
Source:
[{2011] Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications "Population Es-
timates"
[2012{] IPSS "Population Projection for Japan: 2011-2060 (January 2012)"
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Figure 3: Type of labor eciency
Source: MHLW "Basic Survey on Wage Structure 2012"
Note: The parentheses in the legend is the share of each class in 2012.
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Figure 4: Projection of debt output ratio
Source: OECD "Economic Outlook No. 93"
Note:
[2012-2014] Projection by OECD
[2015-] Assumption based on "Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal
Management and Reform" by Japanese Government
29
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Data Model1
Figure 5: Growth rate of output per capita
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Figure 6: Capital output ratio
Note: 'BIJ' denotes the result of Braun et al. (2009).
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Figure 7: Annual hours worked per working population (1970=1)
Note: 'BIJ' denotes the result of Braun et al. (2009).
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Figure 8: Level of utility（Type 1, born in 1911 & scenario (i) = 1）
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Figure 9: Level of output（scenario (i) = 1）
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